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Abstract
Physical-layer security (PLS) has the potential to strongly enhance the overall system security as
an alternative to or in combination with conventional cryptographic primitives usually implemented at
higher network layers. Secret-key generation relying on wireless channel reciprocity is an interesting
solution as it can be efficiently implemented at the physical layer of emerging wireless communication
networks, while providing information-theoretic security guarantees. In this paper, we investigate and
compare the secret-key capacity based on the sampling of the entire complex channel state information
(CSI) or only its envelope, the received signal strength (RSS). Moreover, as opposed to previous works,
we take into account the fact that the eavesdropper’s observations might be correlated and we consider
the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime where we can find simple analytical expressions for the
secret-key capacity. As already found in previous works, we find that RSS-based secret-key generation
is heavily penalized as compared to CSI-based systems. At high SNR, we are able to precisely and
simply quantify this penalty: a halved pre-log factor and a constant penalty of about 0.69 bit, which
disappears as Eve’s channel gets highly correlated.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Problem Statement
We consider in this paper the problem of generating secret keys between two legitimate users
(Alice and Bob), subject to an illegitimate user (Eve) trying to recover the key. Maurer [2]
and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [3] were the first to analyze the problem of generating a secret key
from correlated observations. In the source model (see Fig. 1), Alice, Bob and Eve observe
the realizations of a discrete memoryless source. From their sequence of observations, Alice
and Bob have to distill an identical key that remains secret from Eve. Moreover, Alice and
Bob have access to a public error-free authenticated channel with unlimited capacity. This helps
them to perform information reconciliation, i.e., exchanging a few parity bits so as to agree on a
common sequence of symbols. However, since the channel is public, Eve can gain information
about the secret key from these parity bits, on top of her own channel observations that can
also be correlated with Alice and Bob observations. This is why privacy amplification is usually
implemented after information reconciliation, which consists in reducing the size of the key,
through, e.g., universal hashing, so that Eve information about the key is completely eliminated.
Upper and lower bounds for the secret-key capacity, defined as the number of secret bits that
can be generated per observation of the source, were derived in [2], [3].
A practical source of common randomness at Alice and Bob consists of the wireless channel
reciprocity, which implies that the propagation channel from Alice to Bob and from Bob to
Alice is identical if both are measured within the same channel coherence time and at the same
frequency. At successive coherence times, Alice and Bob can repeatedly sample the channel by
sending each other a pilot symbol so as to obtain a set of highly correlated observations and
finally start a key-distillation procedure. In this paper, we investigate the secret-key capacity
relying on the entire complex channel state information (CSI) or only on the channel envelope,
sometimes also referred to as received signal strength (RSS)1. We also consider the case where
Eve’s observations are correlated with the ones of Alice and Bob, which can occur in many
practical situations, as explained in next section.
1We focus the whole study in this paper on the envelope of the channel, not its power. However, the final results in terms of
capacity are equivalent given the one-to-one relationship between envelope and power.
3B. State of the Art
This study falls into the broad field of physical-layer security (PLS), which has attracted
much interest in the recent decade as a competitive candidate to provide authentication, integrity
and confidentiality in future communication networks [4]–[6]. We refer to [7] for an overview
on the area. In the context of secret-key generation based on wireless reciprocity, there has
been a large amount of related works, both from theoretical and experimental aspects [8]–[10].
Many works have considered using RSS as a source of randomness for secret-key generation,
including multiple-antenna systems [11]–[17]. The choice of using RSS over full CSI has two
main advantages: i) as opposed to CSI, RSS indicators are usually available at the higher layers of
the communication layers, allowing for simple implementation of the key distillation procedure,
relying on the legacy network infrastructure and ii) RSS is intrinsically more robust to phase
offsets between Alice and Bob, relaxing constraints on the hardware, the synchronization and
the reciprocity calibration.
The main disadvantage of RSS-based secret-key generation is that it does not use the full
channel information and thus achieves a lower secret-key capacity than its CSI-based counterpart.
This solution has also been studied in many different works. CSI-based secret-key capacity
is generally easier to characterize analytically, which has been done in a large number of
works [18], [19], relying on multi-antenna systems [20]–[24], ultrawideband channels [25],
and on the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing modulation [26]–[29]. The authors in
[15] analytically compare RSS and CSI approaches. The work of [30] also compares the two
approaches relying on a thorough experimental study in various propagation environments, with
different degrees of mobility.
The majority of works in the literature considers that Eve gets no side information about the key
from her observations, which consist of the pilots transmitted by Alice and Bob [11], [19], [20],
[22], [23]. Often, this assumption is justified by the fact that: (i) Eve is supposed to be separated
from Bob and Alice by more than one wavelength (otherwise she could be easily detected) and
(ii) the channel environment is supposed to be rich enough in scattering implying that the fading
process of the channels at the different antennas can be considered independent. The assumption
of rapid decorrelation in space has been further validated through measurement campaigns [11],
[19], [30]–[32]. Moreover, this assumption simplifies the expression of the secret-key capacity,
which simply becomes equal to the mutual information between Alice and Bob. However, it
4often occurs in practical scenarios that scatterers are clustered with small angular spread rather
than being uniformly distributed, which leads to much longer spatial decorrelation length, as was
shown in [1] for practical 3GPP channel models. In [33], the authors studied the impact of channel
sparsity, inducing correlated eavesdropping, on the secret-key capacity. In [34], the impact of
the number of paths and the eavesdropper separation is analytically studied. In [35], spatial and
time correlation of the channel is taken into account using a Jakes Doppler model. In [36], [37],
experiments are conducted indoor to evaluate the correlation of the eavesdropper’s observations
and its impact on the secret-key capacity. A similar study is conducted for a MIMO indoor
measurement campaign in [21]. The work of [17] also uses an indoor experimental approach
and proposes results of cross-correlation, mutual information and secret-key rates, which depend
on the eavesdropper’s position.
C. Contributions
Our main contribution is to propose a novel analytical comparison of the secret-key capacity
based on RSS and CSI. As opposed to similar previous works such as [15], we do not assume
that Eve’s observations are uncorrelated. This more general case adds to the complexity of the
study while remaining of practical importance. Moreover, the authors in [15] could characterize
the secret-key capacity for envelope sampling with a simple analytical expression. However, their
simplification relied on the approximation of a sum of envelope components as Gaussian, which
is not applicable for our channel model. Furthermore, other works have already compared RSS
and CSI-based approaches taking into account correlated eavesdropping, such as [30]. However,
the studies were mostly conducted experimentally and not analytically.
More specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows: 1) We evaluate lower and
upper bounds on the secret-key capacity for both the complex (full CSI) and the envelope (RSS)
cases. In the complex case, we obtain simple closed-form expressions, while, in the envelope
case, the bounds must be evaluated numerically. Some of the expressions in the complex case
were already obtained in previous works. We chose to present them again in this work to provide
a systematic framework and useful comparison benchmarks for the envelope case. 2) We show
that, in a number of particular cases, the lower and upper bounds become tight: low correlation
of the eavesdropper, relatively smaller noise variance at Bob than Alice (and vice versa) and
specific high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regimes. 3) We show that, as soon as Alice (or Bob
since everything is symmetrical) samples the envelope of her channel estimate, the other parties
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Eve
Source
Public channel
Fig. 1. Source model for secret-key agreement.
do not loose information by taking the envelopes of their own channel estimates. 4) We show
that, in the high SNR regime, the bounds can be evaluated in closed-form and result in simple
expressions. The penalty of envelope-based versus complex-based secret-key generation is: i)
a pre-log factor of 1/2 instead of 1, implying a slower slope of the secret-key capacity as a
function of SNR and ii) a constant penalty of 0.69 bit, which disappears as Eve’s channel gets
highly correlated.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the transmission model
used in this work. Sections III and IV study the secret-key capacity based on complex and
envelope sampling, respectively. Section V numerically validates the theoretical results. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations
Matrices are denoted by bold uppercase letters. Non bold upper case letter refers to a random
variable. Superscript ∗ stands for conjugate operator. The symbol <(.) denotes the real part. 
is the imaginary unit. |A| is the determinant of matrix A. The letters e and γ refer to the Euler
number and the Euler-Mascheroni constant respectively. h(.) and I(.; .) refer to the differential
entropy and the mutual information respectively. We use the notation f(x) = O(g(x)), as x→ a,
if there exist positive numbers δ and λ such that |f(x)| ≤ λg(x) when 0 < |x− a| < δ.
II. TRANSMISSION MODEL
Alice and Bob extract a common key from observations of their shared channel H , assumed
to be reciprocal. The channel H is repeatedly sampled in time based on the transmission of a
priori known pilots by Alice and Bob. We assume that the successive observations of H are
distant enough in time so that they can be considered independent. During these successive
observations, the environment remains stationary so that they can be considered as identically
6distributed. Considering a narrowband channel, the estimates of H at Alice’s and Bob’s sides,
respectively denoted by HˆA and HˆB, are given by
HˆA = H +WA, HˆB = H +WB,
where the additive noise samples WA and WB are modeled as independent zero mean circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian (ZMCSCG) random variables with variances σ2A and σ
2
B respec-
tively.
The strategy of Eve consists in going as close as possible from Bob’s antenna to try to
maximize the correlation of its channel2. Then, Eve estimates her channel HE between Alice’s
antenna and hers by intercepting the pilots sent from Alice to Bob. Since Eve is close to Bob,
the channel from Alice to Eve will be spatially correlated with H while the channel between
Bob and Eve will experience a negligible correlation with H . Therefore, we neglect the pilot
sent by Bob and received by Eve in the following as she cannot get any useful information from
it [34]. The channel estimate of Eve is given by
HˆE = HE +WE,
where WE is modeled as ZMCSCG with variance σ2E . If Alice and Bob transmit a pilot of equal
power and Alice, Bob and Eve use a similar receiver, one could expect a situation of equal noise
variance σ2A = σ
2
B = σ
2
E . On the other hand, Eve could use a more powerful receiver than Alice
and/or Bob by having, e.g., a larger antenna size, a multi-antenna receiver or an amplifier with
lower noise figure. This would result in a lower noise variance σ2E . Moreover, a different pilot
power transmitted by Alice and Bob will induce variations in their noise variances σ2A and σ
2
B.
Indeed, in practice, the channel estimates HˆA, HˆB and HˆE are obtained by dividing the received
signal, which includes the additive noise, by an a priori known pilot. For instance, if the pilot
transmitted by Bob has a stronger power, the noise power at Alice σ2A will be relatively weaker.
This scenario corresponds to the memoryless source model for secret-key agreement [3], [7]
represented in Fig. 1: Alice, Bob and Eve observe a set of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) repetitions of the random variables HˆA, HˆB and HˆE . Moreover, an error-free authenticated
public channel of unlimited capacity is available for communication. All parties have access to
the public channel.
2Note that all of the following derivations are symmetrical if Eve gets close to Alice instead of Bob.
7In the following section, we will study the secret-key capacity of this model. To do this,
we need to know the probability distributions of the random variables HˆA, HˆB and HˆE , which
directly depend on the probability distributions of WA, WB, WE , H and HE . The distributions
of WA, WB and WE were already detailed. Moreover, measurement campaigns have shown that
the channels H and HE can be accurately modeled with a ZMCSCG distribution, especially
in non-line-of-sight situations and rich scattering environments [38]. Therefore, we assume that
(H,HE) follows a ZMCSCG with covariance matrix given by
CHHE = p
 1 ρ
ρ∗ 1
 ,
where p is the channel variance, such that 0 < p <∞ and ρ is the spatial correlation coefficient,
such that 0 ≤ |ρ| ≤ 1. We assume that H and HE have the same variance p, which makes sense
in practice if Bob and Eve are close enough so as to belong to the same local area [38]. In
the following, we use the fact the differential entropy of a circularly symmetric Gaussian with
covariance C is given by log2(|pieC|), where e is the Euler number.
In the sequel, at different places, we will consider the high SNR regime. When this regime
is considered, we will always assume, implicitly or explicitly, that, as σ2A → 0, σ2B → 0 and
σ2E → 0,
(As1): the ratio σ
2
A
σ2B
remains fixed and 0 < σ
2
A
σ2B
<∞,
(As2): the ratio σ
2
A
σ2E
remains fixed and 0 < σ
2
A
σ2E
<∞,
(As3): the ratio σ
2
B
σ2E
remains fixed and 0 < σ
2
B
σ2E
<∞.
III. SECRET-KEY CAPACITY BASED ON COMPLEX CHANNEL SAMPLING
In this section, we analyze the secret-key capacity associated with complex channel sampling,
that we denote by CCplexs . Some of the results were already derived in previous works. Moreover,
most of them result from a direct evaluation of standard formulas for the differential entropy
of Gaussian random variables. We still present them as they provide accurate benchmarks as a
comparison with the envelope case presented in Section IV.
The secret-key capacity is defined as the maximal rate at which Alice and Bob can agree on
a secret-key while keeping the rate at which Eve obtains information about the key arbitrarily
small for a sufficiently large number of observations. Moreover, Alice and Bob should agree
on a common key with high probability and the key should approach the uniform distribution.
We refer to [2], [3], [7] for a formal definition. As explained in Section II, we consider that
8Eve gets useful information from her observation HˆE over H . This implies that the secret-key
capacity is not simply equal to I(HˆA; HˆB), as was considered in many previous works [11], [18],
[19], [22], [23]. Finding the general expression of the secret-key capacity for a given probability
distribution of HˆA, HˆB, HˆE is still an open problem. From [2], [3] [7, Prop. 5.4], the secret-key
capacity, expressed in the number of generated secret bits per channel observation, can be lower
and upper bounded as follows
CCplexs ≥ I(HˆA; HˆB)−min
[
I(HˆA; HˆE), I(HˆB; HˆE)
]
(1)
CCplexs ≤ min
[
I(HˆA; HˆB), I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE)
]
. (2)
The lower bound (1) implies that, if Eve has less information about HˆB than Alice or respectively
about HˆA than Bob, such a difference can be leveraged for secrecy [2]. Moreover, this rate can
be achieved with one-way communication. On the other hand, the upper bound (2) implies that
the secret-key rate cannot exceed the mutual information between Alice and Bob. Moreover, the
secret-key rate cannot be higher than the mutual information between Alice and Bob if they
happened to learn Eve’s observation HˆE . In particular cases, the lower and upper bounds can
become tight. In our context, three particular cases can be distinguished:
1) ρ = 0: Eve does not learn anything about H from HˆE , which becomes independent from
HˆA and HˆB. This leads to the trivial result CCplexs = I(HˆA; HˆB).
2) σ2B = 0: this implies that HˆA → HˆB → HˆE forms a Markov chain, which leads to
CCplexs = I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE) = I(HˆA; HˆB)− I(HˆA; HˆE) [7, Corol. 4.1].
3) σ2A = 0: symmetrically as in 2), C
Cplex
s = I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE) = I(HˆA; HˆB)− I(HˆB; HˆE).
Cases 2) and 3) can be verified in practice as the receiver of Alice or Bob is significantly noisier
than the one of the other: as σ2A → 0 for a fixed value of σ2B or as σ2B → 0 for a fixed value of
σ2A. This would happen for instance if the power of Alice pilot is much stronger than the one
of Bob.
In the next subsections, we evaluate the different expressions of the mutual information
required to compute the lower and upper bounds of (1) and (2): i) the mutual information between
Alice and Bob I(HˆA; HˆB); ii) the mutual information between Alice and Eve I(HˆA; HˆE), and
similarly for Bob I(HˆB; HˆE); and iii) the conditional mutual information between Alice and
Bob given Eve’s observations I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE).
9CCplexs ≥ log2
1 + p
σ2A + σ
2
B +
σ2Aσ
2
B
p
− log2
1 + p|ρ|2
p(1− |ρ|2) + max(σ2A, σ2B) + σ2E + max(σ
2
A,σ
2
B)σ
2
E
p
 .
(3)
CCplexs ≤ log2
( [
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
E)− |ρp|2
] [
(p+ σ2B)(p+ σ
2
E)− |ρp|2
]
(p+ σ2E) [(p(σ
2
A + σ
2
B) + σ
2
Aσ
2
B)(p+ σ
2
E)− |ρp|2(σ2A + σ2B)]
)
. (4)
A. Mutual Information between Alice and Bob
Using previously introduced transmission and channel models, we can find that the random
variables HˆA and HˆB are jointly Gaussian distributed with covariance
CHˆAHˆB =
p+ σ2A p
p p+ σ2B
 .
From this distribution, we find back the result of [18]
I(HˆA; HˆB) = h(HˆA) + h(HˆB)− h(HˆA, HˆB) (5)
= log2
(
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
B)
|CHˆAHˆB |
)
= log2
1 + p
σ2A + σ
2
B +
σ2Aσ
2
B
p
 .
This rate corresponds to the secret-key capacity in case of uncorrelated observations at Eve
(ρ = 0). At high SNR, as σ2A → 0 and σ2B → 0, the expressions becomes
I(HˆA; HˆB) = log2
(
p
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
+O
(
σ2A
)
, (6)
which is characterized by a pre-log factor of one.
B. Mutual Information between Alice/Bob and Eve
We can observe that HˆA and HˆE are jointly Gaussian distributed with covariance
CHˆAHˆE =
p+ σ2A ρp
ρ∗p p+ σ2E
 .
This leads to the mutual information
I(HˆA; HˆE) = log2
(
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
E)
|CHˆAHˆE |
)
= log2
1 + p|ρ|2
p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E + σ
2
Aσ
2
E
p
 .
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The mutual information I(HˆB; HˆE) can be similarly obtained, simply replacing subscript A by
B. Using the previously derived expressions of I(HˆA; HˆB), I(HˆA; HˆE) and I(HˆB; HˆE), we find
that the lower bound in (1) evaluates to (3). Note that the lower bound is not restricted to be
positive (as will also be shown numerically in Section V), in which case it becomes useless
since, by definition, CCplexs ≥ 0. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily imply that CCplexs = 0. We
can find the condition on the minimum noise variance at Eve σ2E for having a larger-than-zero
lower bound
σ2E > p(|ρ|2 − 1) + |ρ|2 min(σ2A, σ2B). (7)
In the worst-case, |ρ| = 1 and σ2E has to be larger than the minimum of the noise variances
of Alice and Bob. We can invert (7) to find the maximal correlation coefficient |ρ|2 to have a
larger-than-zero lower bound
|ρ|2 < p+ σ
2
E
p+ min(σ2A, σ
2
B)
.
In the high SNR regime, as σ2A → 0, σ2B → 0 and σ2E → 0, equation (3) becomes
CCplexs ≥ log2
(
p
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
− log2
(
p
p(1− |ρ|2) + max(σ2A, σ2B) + σ2E
)
+O
(
σ2A
)
. (8)
As soon as |ρ| < 1, CCplexs is unbounded and goes to infinity at high SNR. Indeed,
lim
σ2A,σ
2
B→0
I(HˆA; HˆB) = +∞, lim
σ2A,σ
2
E→0
I(HˆA; HˆE) = lim
σ2B ,σ
2
E→0
I(HˆB; HˆE) = log2
(
1
1− |ρ|2
)
,
which is bounded for |ρ| < 1.
C. Conditional Mutual Information between Alice and Bob
We can note that HˆA, HˆB and HˆE are jointly Gaussian distributed with covariance matrix
CHˆAHˆBHˆE =

p+ σ2A p ρp
p p+ σ2B ρp
ρ∗p ρ∗p p+ σ2E
 ,
which gives
I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE) = h(HˆA, HˆE)− h(HˆE) + h(HˆB, HˆE)− h(HˆA, HˆB, HˆE) (9)
= log2
(
|CHˆAHˆE ||CHˆBHˆE |
(p+ σ2E)|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
)
.
11
The upper bound in (2) is then given by the minimum of I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE) and I(HˆA; HˆB). In
Appendix VII-A, we prove that the condition I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE) ≤ I(HˆA; HˆB) is always verified
under the jointly Gaussian channel model considered in this work. The upper bound is thus
given by (4).
Based on the analytical expressions of the upper and lower bounds, we can find a novel
condition for tightness of the bounds at high SNR.
Proposition 1. Under (As1)− (As3), as σ2A → 0, σ2B → 0 and σ2E → 0, if |ρ| < 1, the upper
and low bounds of (3) and (4) become tight and the secret-key capacity is given by
CCplexs = log2
(
p(1− |ρ|2)
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
+O
(
σ2A
)
. (10)
Proof. The proof is easily obtained by taking the limits in (3) and (4) and seeing that they both
converge towards (10), provided that |ρ| < 1.
IV. SECRET-KEY CAPACITY BASED ON CHANNEL ENVELOPE SAMPLING
The goal of this section is to evaluate the impact on the secret-key capacity if Alice and Bob
rely on the envelopes of their observations rather than the complex values to generate a secret
key. We denote by CEvlpes the secret-key capacity based on envelope sampling. We also introduce
the notations
HˆA = RˆAe
ΦˆA , HˆB = RˆBe
ΦˆB , HˆE = RˆEe
ΦˆE ,
where RˆA, RˆB and RˆE are the random modules of HˆA, HˆB and HˆE respectively. Similarly, ΦˆA,
ΦˆB and ΦˆE are their random phases. Note that HˆA is equivalently represented by RˆA and ΦˆA or
<(HˆA) and =(HˆA). We start by stating an insightful result from [15, Th. 2], that we generalize
for Eve’s observations.
Proposition 2. The mutual information I(HˆA; HˆB) satisfies
I(HˆA; HˆB) = I(<(HˆA);<(HˆB)) + I(=(HˆA);=(HˆB))
≥ I(RˆA; RˆB) + I(ΦˆA; ΦˆB).
Proof. The proof is obtained as a particular case of Proposition 3 for ρ = 1 and replacing
subscripts E by B.
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Proposition 3. The mutual information I(HˆA; HˆE) satisfies
I(HˆA; HˆE) = I(<(HˆA);<(HˆE)) + I(=(HˆA);=(HˆE))
≥ I(RˆA; RˆE) + I(ΦˆA; ΦˆE).
Proof. We here give the main lines of the proof to give the general intuition to the reader.
Complements for the dependence of random variables are given in Appendix VII-B. On the one
hand, we have
I(HˆA; HˆE) = I(RˆA, ΦˆA; RˆE, ΦˆE)
= h(RˆA, ΦˆA)− h(RˆA, ΦˆA|RˆE, ΦˆE)
(∗)
= h(RˆA)− h(RˆA|RˆE, ΦˆE) + h(ΦˆA)− h(ΦˆA|RˆA, RˆE, ΦˆE)
(∗∗)
≥ I(RˆA; RˆE) + I(ΦˆA; ΦˆE),
where (∗) follows from the chain rule for entropy and the fact that RˆA and ΦˆA are independent
since the envelope and the phase of a ZMCSG are independent. (∗∗) follows from the fact that: i)
h(RˆA|RˆE, ΦˆE) = h(RˆA|RˆE) since (RˆA, RˆE) and ΦˆE are independent; ii) h(ΦˆA|RˆA, RˆE, ΦˆE) ≥
h(ΦˆA|ΦˆE) by the general properties of differential entropy and since (ΦˆA, ΦˆE) is not independent
from (RˆA, RˆE).
On the other hand, a similar derivation can be made for I(<(HˆA),=(HˆA);<(HˆE),=(HˆE)),
noticing that HˆA and HˆE are two ZMCSG, implying that their real and imaginary parts are
independent, resulting in an equality with I(HˆA; HˆE).
Intuitively, this result can be explained by the fact that the random vectors (ΦˆA, ΦˆE) and
(RˆA, RˆE) are not independent from one another while (<(HˆA),<(HˆE)) and (=(HˆA),=(HˆE))
are. There is thus a loss of information by treating phase and envelope separately as opposed to
real and imaginary parts.
One could wonder what is the best strategy of Bob and Eve if Alice uses RˆA to generate a key.
Imagine Bob and Eve have a more advanced receiver so that they can sample their observations
in the complex domain, would it be beneficial for them? The answer is no, as shown in the two
following propositions.
Proposition 4. If Alice uses the envelope of her observations RˆA, then Bob does not loose
information by taking the envelope of HˆB, i.e., I(RˆA; HˆB) = I(RˆA; RˆB). The same result holds
if Alice and Bob’s roles are interchanged.
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Proof. The proof is obtained as a particular case of Proposition 5 for ρ = 1 and replacing
subscripts E by B.
Proposition 5. If Alice uses the envelope of her observations RˆA, then Eve does not loose
information by taking the envelope of HˆE , i.e., I(RˆA; HˆE) = I(RˆA; RˆE). The same result holds
for Bob’s observations.
Proof. Here again, we refer to Appendix VII-B for the complementary proofs on dependence
of random variables. By definition, we have
I(RˆA; RˆE, ΦˆE) = h(RˆE, ΦˆE)− h(RˆE, ΦˆE|RˆA)
(∗)
= h(RˆE) + h(ΦˆE)−
(
h(RˆE|RˆA) + h(ΦˆE|RˆA, RˆE)
)
(∗∗)
= I(RˆA; RˆE),
where (∗) relies on the chain rule for entropy and the fact that RˆE and ΦˆE are independent
since the envelope and the phase of a ZMCSG are independent. (∗∗) relies on the fact that:
i) h(ΦˆE|RˆE) = h(ΦˆE) since envelope and the phase of a ZMCSG are independent and ii)
h(ΦˆE|RˆA, RˆE) = h(ΦˆE) since (RˆA, RˆE) and ΦˆE are independent.
Intuitively, the propositions can be explained by the fact that ΦˆB and ΦˆE are independent
from (RˆA, RˆB) and (RˆA, RˆE) respectively. The propositions provide practical insight in the
sense that, as soon as Alice (or Bob since everything is symmetrical) samples the envelope of
her channel estimate, the other parties do not loose information by taking the envelopes of their
own channel estimates. The other way around, Bob or Eve would not gain information to work
on their complex channel estimate. In the lights of this result, the definitions of the bounds of
the secret-key capacity defined in (1) and (2) also hold here by replacing the complex values by
their envelopes, i.e., RˆA, RˆB and RˆE instead of HˆA, HˆB and HˆE respectively:
CEvlpes ≥ I(RˆA; RˆB)−min
[
I(RˆA; RˆE), I(RˆB; RˆE)
]
(11)
CEvlpes ≤ min
[
I(RˆA; RˆB), I(RˆA; RˆB|RˆE)
]
. (12)
Tight bounds can be found in the same cases and for the same reasons as in the complex
case: 1) ρ = 0, 2) σ2B = 0 and 3) σ
2
A = 0.
Similarly as in Section III, we evaluate in the following subsections the quantities required
to compute the lower and upper bounds (11) and (12): i) the mutual information between Alice
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and Bob I(RˆA; RˆB); ii) the mutual information between Alice and Eve I(RˆA; RˆE), and similarly
for Bob I(RˆB; RˆE); and iii) the conditional mutual information between Alice and Bob given
Eve’s observations I(RˆA; RˆB|RˆE).
A. Mutual Information between Alice and Bob
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is given by
I(RˆA; RˆB) = h(RˆA) + h(RˆB)− h(RˆA, RˆB). (13)
The envelope of a ZMCSG random variable is well known to be Rayleigh distributed, i.e.,
RˆA ∼ Rayleigh(
√
p+σ2A
2
) and RˆB ∼ Rayleigh(
√
p+σ2B
2
). The differential entropy of a Rayleigh
distribution is also well known and is equal to [39]
h(RˆA) =
1
2
log2
(
p+ σ2A
4
)
+
1
2
log2(e
2+γ) (14)
h(RˆB) =
1
2
log2
(
p+ σ2B
4
)
+
1
2
log2(e
2+γ), (15)
where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant and e is the Euler number. On the other hand, the
joint differential entropy of (RˆA, RˆB) is more difficult to compute. The following lemma gives
the joint probability density function (PDF) of (RˆA, RˆB).
Lemma 1. The joint PDF of (RˆA, RˆB) is given by
fRˆA,RˆB(rˆA, rˆB) =
4rˆArˆB
p(σ2A + σ
2
B) + σ
2
Aσ
2
B
I0
(
2prˆArˆB
p(σ2A + σ
2
B) + σ
2
Aσ
2
B
)
exp
(
− rˆ
2
A(p+ σ
2
B) + rˆ
2
B(p+ σ
2
A)
p(σ2A + σ
2
B) + σ
2
Aσ
2
B
)
,
where I0(.) is the zero order modified Bessel function of the first kind.
Proof. The proof is obtained as a particular case of Lemma 3 for ρ = 1 and replacing subscripts
E by B.
Unfortunately, finding a closed-form expression for the joint differential entropy h(RˆA, RˆB) is
non-trivial given the presence of the Bessel function [39]. Still, h(RˆA, RˆB) and thus I(RˆA; RˆB),
can be evaluated by numerical integration, relying on the PDF obtained in Lemma 1.
In the high SNR regime, the following lemma shows the limiting behavior of the PDF
fRˆA,RˆB(rˆA, rˆB), which can be used to obtain a simple closed-form expression of I(RˆA; RˆB),
as shown in the subsequent theorem.
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High SNR (σ2A, σ
2
B → 0), uncorrelated (ρ = 0) High SNR (σ2A, σ2B , σ2E → 0), correlated (|ρ| > 0)
Complex CCplexs = log2
(
p
σ2
A
+σ2
B
)
+O(σ2A) C
Cplex
s ≥ log2
(
p
σ2
A
+σ2
B
)
− log2
(
p
p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2∗+σ2E
)
+O(σ2A)
Envelope CEvlpes = 12 log2
(
p
σ2
A
+σ2
B
)
− χ+ uncrl CEvlpes ≥
|ρ|→1
1
2
[
log2
(
p
σ2
A
+σ2
B
)
− log2
(
p
p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2∗+σ2E
)]
+ crl
TABLE I
HIGH SNR SECRET-KEY CAPACITY OF COMPLEX (CSI) VERSUS ENVELOPE (RSS) SAMPLING IN BOTH UNCORRELATED
AND CORRELATED CASES, UNDER (As1)-(As3). χ = 0.69..., σ2∗ = max(σ2A, σ
2
B), uncrl → 0, crl → 0 ASYMPTOTICALLY.
Lemma 2. Under (As1), as σ2A → 0 and σ2B → 0, the PDF fRˆA,RˆB(rˆA, rˆB) asymptotically
converges to
fRˆA,RˆB(rˆA, rˆB) =
2rˆAe
− rˆ
2
A
p
p
e
− (rˆB−rˆA)
2
σ2
A
+σ2
B√
pi(σ2A + σ
2
B)
+O (σA) ,
which corresponds to the product of a Rayleigh distribution of parameter p
2
and a conditional
normal distribution centered in RˆA and of variance
σ2A+σ
2
B
2
.
Proof. The proof is obtained as a particular case of Lemma 4 for ρ = 1 and replacing subscripts
E by B. Since ρ = 1, the limit |ρ| → 1 can be omitted.
Theorem 1. Under (As1), as σ2A → 0 and σ2B → 0, the mutual information I(RˆA; RˆB) converges
to
I(RˆA; RˆB)→1
2
log2
(
p
σ2A + σ
2
B
)
− χ,
where χ = 1
2
log2
(
4pi
e1+γ
)
is a constant penalty, given by 0.69 (up to the two first decimals).
Proof. The proof is obtained as a particular case of Theorem 2 for ρ = 1 and replacing subscripts
E by B. Since ρ = 1, the limit |ρ| → 1 can be omitted.
The expression obtained in Theorem 1 gives a lot of insight on the high SNR secret-key
capacity that can be obtained with envelope sampling, when there is no correlation (ρ = 0). As
shown in the left column of Table I, two penalties can be observed as compared to complex
sampling: i) a pre-log factor of 1/2 instead of 1, implying a curve with smaller slope and ii) an
additional penalty of a constant χ equivalent to about 0.69 bit.
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B. Mutual Information between Alice/Bob and Eve
We now analyze the mutual information between Alice and Eve and between Bob and Eve,
which are given by
I(RˆA; RˆE) = h(RˆA) + h(RˆE)− h(RˆA, RˆE) (16)
I(RˆB; RˆE) = h(RˆB) + h(RˆE)− h(RˆB, RˆE).
We already computed the values of h(RˆA) and h(RˆB). Similarly as for RˆA and RˆB, we find
that RˆE ∼ Rayleigh(
√
p+σ2E
2
) and [39]
h(RˆE) =
1
2
log2
(
p+ σ2E
4
)
+
1
2
log2(e
2+γ). (17)
The following lemma gives the joint PDFs of (RˆA, RˆE) and (RˆB, RˆE).
Lemma 3. The joint PDF of (RˆA, RˆE) is given by
fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) =
4rˆArˆE
p2(1− |ρ|2) + p(σ2A + σ2E) + σ2Aσ2E
I0
(
2p|ρ|rˆArˆE
p2(1− |ρ|2) + p(σ2A + σ2E) + σ2Aσ2E
)
exp
(
− rˆ
2
A (p+ σ
2
E) + rˆ
2
E (p+ σ
2
A)
p2(1− |ρ|2) + p(σ2A + σ2E) + σ2Aσ2E
)
.
The joint PDF fRˆB ,RˆE(rˆB, rˆE) is similarly obtained, replacing subscripts A by B.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix VII-B.
As for h(RˆA, RˆB), it is difficult to find a closed-form expression of h(RˆA, RˆE) and h(RˆB, RˆE)
due to the presence of the Bessel function. However, they can be evaluated numerically using
the PDFs obtained in Lemma 3 so that I(RˆA; RˆE) and I(RˆB; RˆE) can be evaluated. Still, in
specific regimes, closed-form solutions can be found.
In the low correlation regime, when |ρ| → 0, it is easy to see that fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) converges
to the product of two independent Rayleigh PDFs fRˆA(rˆA)fRˆE(rˆE) and thus h(RˆA, RˆE) =
h(RˆA) + h(RˆE). As could be expected, we find that I(RˆA; RˆE) = I(RˆB; RˆE) = 0 and the
secret-key capacity is given by Theorem 1.
In the high SNR and correlation regime, the following lemma shows the limiting behavior
of the PDFs of (RˆA, RˆE) and (RˆB, RˆE), which can be used to obtain a simple closed-form
expression of I(RˆA; RˆE) and I(RˆB; RˆE).
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Lemma 4. Under (As2), as |ρ| → 1, σ2A → 0 and σ2E → 0, the PDF fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) asymptot-
ically converges to
fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) =
2rˆEe
− rˆ
2
E
p
p
e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2
A
+σ2
E√
pi(p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E)
+O
(√
1− |ρ|2 + σ2A
)
,
which corresponds to the product of a Rayleigh and a normal distribution. The same results
holds for fRˆB ,RˆE(rˆB, rˆE), replacing subscripts A by B, under (As3).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix VII-B.
Theorem 2. Under (As2), as |ρ| → 1, σ2A → 0 and σ2E → 0, the mutual information I(RˆA; RˆE)
converges to
I(RˆA; RˆE)→1
2
log2
(
p
p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E
)
− χ,
where the constant penalty χ is defined in Theorem 1. The mutual information I(RˆB; RˆE) can
be similarly approximated by replacing subscripts A by B, under (As3).
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix VII-B.
Using the result of Theorem 2, we can evaluate the lower bound on the secret-key capacity
(11) in the high SNR, high correlated regime, which is given in the right column of Table I. As
compared with the complex case, the only difference is the pre-log factor of 1/2 for envelope
sampling. Note that the constant penalty χ has canceled since it is also present in I(RˆA; RˆB).
As for the complex case, the lower bound is not restricted to be positive, in which case it is
useless. The condition (7) for having a larger-than-zero lower bound, which was derived in the
complex case, also applies here.
C. Conditional Mutual Information between Alice and Bob
As shown in (9) in the complex case, to compute the conditional mutual information I(RˆA; RˆB|RˆE),
we need to evaluate the joint different entropy h(RˆA, RˆB, RˆE). The following lemma gives the
joint PDF of (RˆA, RˆB, RˆE).
Lemma 5. The joint PDF of (RˆA, RˆB, RˆE) is given by
fRˆA,RˆB ,RˆE(rˆA, rˆB, rˆE) =
8rˆArˆB rˆE
|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
G
(
2p(p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2E)rˆArˆB
|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
,
2|ρ|pσ2B rˆArˆE
|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
,
2|ρ|pσ2ArˆB rˆE
|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
)
exp
(
− rˆ
2
A|CHˆBHˆE |+ rˆ2B|CHˆAHˆE |+ rˆ2E|CHˆAHˆB |
|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
)
,
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with the definition of the function G(α1, α2, α3)
G(α1, α2, α3) =
1
(2pi)2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
exp (α1 cos(φ1) + α2 cos(φ2) + α3 cos(φ2 − φ1)) dφ1dφ2.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix VII-C.
Here again, computing an analytical expression of the joint differential entropy of (RˆA, RˆB, RˆE)
is intricate. However, it can be evaluated numerically, so that I(RˆA; RˆB|RˆE) and thus (12) can
be computed.
V. NUMERICAL VALIDATION
This section aims at numerically validating the analytical results presented in previous sections.
The following figures plot the lower bound (LB) and the upper bound (UB) on CCplexs and
CEvlpes . We will show many cases where the bounds become tight, as foreseen by the results
of previous section. The mutual information quantities I(HˆA, HˆB) and I(RˆA, RˆB) are also
plotted for comparison, as they correspond to the secret-key capacity in the case of uncorrelated
observations at Eve, i.e., CCplexs = I(HˆA, HˆB) and C
Evlpe
s = I(RˆA, RˆB) for ρ = 0. They can
also be seen as another UB, looser than I(HˆA, HˆB|HˆE) and I(RˆA, RˆB|RˆE).
A. Impact of SNR
In Fig. 2, the impact of the SNR on CCplexs and C
Evlpe
s is studied. The SNR is defined as
SNR = p/σ2A = p/σ
2
B = p/σ
2
E . A first observation is the large performance gain of complex
sampling versus envelope sampling.
Focusing first on the uncorrelated case (I(HˆA, HˆB) and I(RˆA, RˆB)), two penalties of envelope
sampling in the high SNR regimen were identified in Table I: i) a pre-log factor of 1/2 inducing
a smaller slope as a function of SNR and ii) a constant penalty of χ bit, inducing a translation
of the curve downwards of about 0.69 bit.
In the correlated case (ρ = 0.9), CCplexs and C
Evlpe
s are reduced given the knowledge Eve has
gained from her channel observations. As foreseen by Prop. 1, the bounds on CCplexs become
tight as the SNR grows large and a constant penalty of log2(1 − |ρ|2) ≈ −2.4 bits is observed
as compared to the uncorrelated case. Interestingly, the bounds become tight for CEvlpes , even
for smaller values of SNR. The gap as compared to the uncorrelated case can be approximated
from Table I as 1
2
log2(1 − |ρ|2) + χ ≈ −0.51 bits. The inaccuracy with the simulated gap of
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Fig. 2. Secret-key capacity for complex channel sampling versus envelope sampling as a function of SNR.
−0.67 bit comes from the fact that the LB on CEvlpes in Table I only asymptotically holds for
|ρ| → 1.
B. Impact of Correlation
In Fig. 3, the impact of the correlation coefficient magnitude |ρ| is studied3, for two SNR
regimes. We here consider an identical noise variance at Alice and Bob, while Eve uses a more
powerful receiver so that σ2A = σ
2
B and σ
2
E = σ
2
A/10.
One can see that, as |ρ| → 0, the LB and UB become tight and converge to the mutual
information between Alice and Bob observations. For larger values of |ρ|, bounds are less tight,
especially in the complex case. As foreseen by Prop. 1, for a same value of |ρ| < 1, the LB
and UB become tight for large SNR values. As already discussed in the context of equation (7),
the LBs on the secret-key capacity are not restricted to be positive. This case is observed in
Fig. 3 for large values of |ρ|. Note that this case arises here given the reduced noise power at
Eve σ2E = σ
2
A/10. In practice, the secret-key capacity cannot be lower than zero. We chose not
to put negative values of the LB to zero, as it provides some physical insights on the problem.
3From previous analytical studies, it was shown that CCplexs and CEvlpes only depend on the magnitude of the correlation
coefficient and not on its phase.
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Fig. 3. Secret-key capacity for complex channel sampling versus envelope sampling as a function of correlation coefficient
magnitude |ρ|.
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C. Impact of Different Noise Variances at Alice and Bob
In Fig. 4, the impact of a different noise variance at Alice and Bob is studied. More specifically,
the SNRs at Bob and Eve are kept identical, i.e., p/σ2B = p/σ
2
E , for two SNR regimes (5 dB and
20 dB). On the other hand, the SNR at Alice p/σ2A is varied from 0 to 30 dB. The correlation
coefficient is set to ρ = 0.6.
As foreseen in Sections III and IV, the LB and UB bounds become tight as σ2A → 0 for a
fixed value of σ2B. Moreover, as p/σ
2
A grows large, C
Cplex
s and C
Evlpe
s saturate at a plateau. This
can be explained by the fact that they enter a regime limited by the fixed noise variance at Bob
σ2B.
D. Impact of Different Noise Variance at Eve
In Fig. 5, the impact of a different noise variance at Eve is studied. More specifically, the
SNRs at Alice and Bob are kept identical, i.e., p/σ2A = p/σ
2
B, for two SNR regimes (5 dB and
20 dB). On the other hand, the SNR at Eve p/σ2E is varied from 0 to 30 dB. The correlation
coefficient is set to ρ = 0.8.
According to Prop. 1, the LB and UB are tighter in the higher SNR regime. Moreover, as
p/σ2E grows large, C
Cplex
s and C
Evlpe
s decrease up to a certain floor. This can be explained by
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the fact that Eve performance is not limited by σ2E but by the fixed value of the correlation
coefficient ρ.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have compared the secret-key capacity based on the sampling process of the
entire CSI or only its envelope or RSS, taking into account correlation of Eve’s observations.
We have evaluated lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity. In the complex case,
we obtain simple closed-form expressions. In the envelope case, the bounds must be evaluated
numerically. In a number of particular cases, the lower and upper bounds become tight: low
correlation of the eavesdropper, relatively smaller noise variance at Bob than Alice (or vice
versa) and specific high SNR regimes. Finally, we have shown that, in the high SNR regime,
the bounds can be evaluated in closed-form and result in simple expressions, which highlight
the gain of CSI-based systems. The penalty of envelope-based versus complex-based secret-key
generation is: i) a pre-log factor of 1/2 instead of 1, implying a slower slope of the secret-key
capacity as a function of SNR and ii) a constant penalty of about 0.69 bit, which disappears as
Eve’s channel gets highly correlated.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Upper Bound of Complex Sampling-based Secret-Key Capacity
We need to show that I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE) ≤ I(HˆA; HˆB), which is equivalent to showing that
0 ≥ I(HˆA; HˆB|HˆE)− I(HˆA; HˆB),
or
1 ≥ |CHˆAHˆE ||CHˆBHˆE ||CHˆAHˆB |
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
B)(p+ σ
2
E)|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
0 ≥ |CHˆAHˆE ||CHˆBHˆE ||CHˆAHˆB |
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
B)(p+ σ
2
E)
− |CHˆAHˆBHˆE |.
After computing the expression of each determinant and several simplifications, we obtain
|CHˆAHˆE ||CHˆBHˆE ||CHˆAHˆB |
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
B)(p+ σ
2
E)
− |CHˆAHˆBHˆE | =− |ρ|22p3 +
|ρp|4
p+ σ2E
+ |ρ|2p4
(
1
p+ σ2A
+
1
p+ σ2B
)
− |ρ|
4p6
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
B)(p+ σ
2
E)
.
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We still need to prove that this quantity is smaller or equal to zero. We can first simplify the
inequality by dividing by |ρ|2p3. We then need to show that
0 ≥− 2 + 1
1 + σ2A/p
+
1
1 + σ2B/p
+ |ρ|2 1
1 + σ2E/p
(
1− 1
(1 + σ2A/p)(1 + σ
2
B/p)
)
.
It is easy to see that the term on the right is maximized for σ2E = 0 and |ρ| = 1 (|ρ| ≤ 1 by
definition). It is then sufficient to focus on that critical case and in particular to show that
1 ≥ 1
1 + σ2A/p
+
1
1 + σ2B/p
− 1
(1 + σ2A/p)(1 + σ
2
B/p)
=
1 + σ2A/p+ σ
2
B/p
1 + σ2A/p+ σ
2
B/p+ σ
2
Aσ
2
B/p
2
,
which is always smaller or equal to one given that σ2A, σ
2
B and σ
2
E and p are positive by definition.
B. PDF and Mutual Information of Alice and Eve’s Envelopes
In this section, we address the proofs of the results obtained in Propositions 3 and 5, Lem-
mas 3 and 4 and Theorem 2. We conduct the proof considering Alice case. The proof can be
straightforwardly extended to Bob’s case by replacing subscript A by B in all of the following
expressions. A starting point is to write the PDF of the channel observations at Alice and Eve.
We know that HˆA and HˆE follow a ZMCSG with covariance matrix CHˆAHˆE , which gives
fHˆA,HˆE(hˆA, hˆE) =
1
pi2|CHˆAHˆE |
e
− |hˆA|
2(p+σ2E)+|hˆE |
2(p+σ2A)−2p<(ρ
∗hˆAhˆ∗E)
|C
HˆAHˆE
|
.
We can express this PDF in polar coordinates using the change of variables HˆA = RˆA exp(ΦˆA),
HˆE = RˆE exp(ΦˆE). Doing this, we obtain the joint PDF
fRˆA,ΦˆA,RˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆA, φˆA, rˆE, φˆE) =
rˆArˆE
pi2|CHˆAHˆE |
e
− rˆ
2
A(p+σ
2
E)+rˆ
2
E(p+σ
2
A)−2prˆArˆE |ρ| cos(φˆA−φˆE−∠ρ)
|C
HˆAHˆE
|
. (18)
We now prove each of the results, relying on (18).
1) Complements to the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5: This section derives a set of results
on the dependence of random variables, required in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5.
Firstly, the random vector (ΦˆA, ΦˆE) is not independent from (RˆA, RˆE), if |ρ| > 1. Indeed, by
simple inspection of (18), we can see that
fRˆA,ΦˆA,RˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆA, φˆA, rˆE, φˆE) 6= fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE)fΦˆA,ΦˆE(φˆA, φˆE).
The same result holds for (ΦˆA, ΦˆB) and (RˆA, RˆB), as a particularization to the case ρ = 1 and
replacing subscripts E by B.
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Secondly, ΦˆE and (RˆA, RˆE) are independent. This can be shown by integrating (18) over φˆA
giving
fRˆA,RˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆA, rˆE, φˆE) =
∫ 2pi
0
fRˆA,ΦˆA,RˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆA, φˆA, rˆE, φˆE)dφˆA
=
2rˆArˆE
pi|CHˆAHˆE |
I0
(
2p|ρ|rˆArˆE
|CHˆAHˆE |
)
e
− rˆ
2
A(p+σ
2
E)+rˆ
2
E(p+σ
2
A)
|C
HˆAHˆE
|
, (19)
where I0(.) is the zero order modified Bessel function of the first kind. This shows that
fRˆA,RˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆA, rˆE, φˆE) = fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE)fΦˆE(φˆE).
The same result holds for ΦˆB and (RˆA, RˆB), as a particularization to the case ρ = 1 and replacing
subscripts E by B.
Thirdly, the envelope and the phase of a ZMCSG are independent. Take for instance the PDF
of HˆE , which can be written in polar coordinates, using a change of variable HˆE = RˆE exp(ΦˆE),
as
fRˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆE, φˆE) =
rˆE
pi(p+ σ2E)
e
− rˆ
2
E
p+σ2
E ,
which shows that fRˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆE, φˆE) = fRˆE(rˆE)fΦˆE(φˆE), implying independence. The same result
holds for HˆA and HˆB.
2) Proof of Lemma 3: The joint PDF fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) can be obtained by integrating (19) over
φˆE , which gives
fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) =
∫ 2pi
0
fRˆA,RˆE ,ΦˆE(rˆA, rˆE, φˆE)dφˆE
=
4rˆArˆE
|CHˆAHˆE |
I0
(
2p|ρ|rˆArˆE
|CHˆAHˆE |
)
e
− rˆ
2
A(p+σ
2
E)+rˆ
2
E(p+σ
2
A)
|C
HˆAHˆE
|
, (20)
and leads to the result of Lemma 3, noting that |CHˆAHˆE | = p2(1− |ρ|2) + p(σ2A + σ2E) + σ2Aσ2E .
3) Proof of Lemma 4: From Bessel function theory [40, Eq. 10.40.1], we know that, as
r → +∞,
I0(r) =
er√
2pir
+ 0, |0| = O
(
er
r3/2
)
. (21)
In our case, we have
r =
2p|ρ|rˆArˆE
|CHˆAHˆE |
=
2p|ρ|rˆArˆE
(1− |ρ|2)p2 + p(σ2E + σ2A) + σ2Eσ2A
. (22)
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The Bessel asymptotic expansion is thus accurate when r becomes large. This is precisely the
case as σ2A → 0, σ2E → 0 and |ρ| → 1, for rˆA > 0 and rˆE > 0. Using the Bessel asymptotic
expansion of I0(.) in (20), we get
fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) =
2
p
√
rˆArˆE
|ρ| e
− rˆ
2
Aσ
2
E+rˆ
2
E(σ
2
A+p(1−|ρ|
2))
|C
HˆAHˆE
| 1√
pi|CHˆAHˆE |/p
e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
|C
HˆAHˆE
|/p
+ 1, (23)
where 1 is the approximation error
1 =
4rˆArˆE
|CHˆAHˆE |
exp
(
− rˆ
2
A(p+ σ
2
E) + rˆ
2
E(p+ σ
2
A)
|CHˆAHˆE |
)
0.
Note that, in the particular cases rˆA = 0 or rˆE = 0, 1 = 0 since (23) = (20) = 0. Using (21)
and the definition of r in (22), we can bound the error 1 as follows
|1| = O

(|CHˆAHˆE |)1/2 e− rˆ
2
A(p+σ2E)+rˆ2E(p+σ2A)−2p|ρ|rˆArˆE
|C
HˆAHˆE
|
(p|ρ|)3/2 (rˆArˆE)1/2

= O
(√
1− |ρ|2 + σ2A + σ2E
)
,
where we used the fact that the exponential can be bounded in the asymptotic regime by
an independent constant. The second term exponential term of (23) suggests the following
approximation rˆA ≈ |ρ|rˆE . We thus obtain
fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) =
2rˆEe
−rˆ2E
p(1−|ρ|2)+|ρ|2σ2E+σ
2
A
|C
HˆAHˆE
|
p
e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
|C
HˆAHˆE
|/p√
pi|CHˆAHˆE |/p
+ 1 + 2, (24)
where 2 is the approximation error related to this second approximation
2 =
2
p
e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
|C
HˆAHˆE
|/p√
pi|CHˆAHˆE |/p
(√
rˆArˆE
|ρ| e
− rˆ
2
Aσ
2
E+rˆ
2
E(σ
2
A+p(1−|ρ|
2))
|C
HˆAHˆE
| − rˆEe
−rˆ2E
p(1−|ρ|2)+|ρ|2σ2E+σ
2
A
|C
HˆAHˆE
|
)
.
When rˆA = |ρ|rˆE , the term in parenthesis is exactly zero and so 2 = 0. In other cases, it can
be bounded by an independent constant as σ2A → 0, σ2E → 0 and |ρ| → 1, giving
|2| =O
 e− β(1−|ρ|2)+σ2A+σ2E√
1− |ρ|2 + σ2A + σ2E
 ,
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where β is some real strictly positive constant. Moreover, we can still simplify (24) by performing
the two following approximations |CHˆAHˆE |/p ≈ p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E and
p(1−|ρ|2)+|ρ|2σ2E+σ2A
|CHˆAHˆE |
≈
1/p so that we get
fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) =
2rˆEe
− rˆ
2
E
p
p
e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2
A
+σ2
E√
pi(p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E)
+ 1 + 2 + 3 + 4,
which gives the asymptotic distribution of Lemma 4 and where 3 and 4 are the approximation
errors related to the approximations
3 =
2rˆE
p
√
pi|CHˆAHˆE |/p
(
e
−rˆ2E
p(1−|ρ|2)+|ρ|2σ2E+σ
2
A
|C
HˆAHˆE
| −
p(rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)2
|C
HˆAHˆE
| − e−
rˆ2E
p e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2
A
+σ2
E
)
4 =
2rˆEe
− rˆ
2
E
p e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2
A
+σ2
E
p
√
pi
 1√
|CHˆAHˆE |/p
− 1√
p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E
 .
To bound 3 and 4, we can use a first order Taylor expansion of the exponential and the inverse
of a square root respectively. We find
|3| = O
(
(1− |ρ|2)σ2E + σ2Aσ2E
(1− |ρ|2 + σ2A + σ2E)3/2
)
|4| = O
(
σ2A + σ
2
E√
1− |ρ|2 + σ2A + σ2E
)
.
Finally, combining the bounds on the approximation errors 1, 2, 3 and 4, we find that the total
approximation error can be bounded as
|1 + 2 + 3 + 4| = O
(√
1− |ρ|2 + σ2A
)
,
where we used (As2). This completes the proof.
4) Proof of Theorem 2: Let us define the asymptotic PDF of fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) as
fHigh
RˆA,RˆE
(rˆA, rˆE) =
2rˆEe
− rˆ
2
E
p
p
e
− (rˆA−|ρ|rˆE)
2
p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2
A
+σ2
E√
pi(p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E)
.
We can see that the PDF factorizes as fHigh
RˆA,RˆE
(rˆA, rˆE) = f1(rˆE)f2(rˆA|rˆE). We can identify f1(rˆE)
to be a Rayleigh distribution with parameter p
2
, while the conditional PDF f2(rˆA|rˆE) is a normal
centered in |ρ|rˆE and of variance (p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E)/2.
Results such as [41, Th. 1] can be used to prove that, for a sequence of PDFs such that
fHigh
RˆA,RˆE
(rˆA, rˆE) → fRˆA,RˆE(rˆA, rˆE) pointwise, their differential entropy also converges provided
that: i) their second order moments are bounded from above and ii) their PDF is bounded from
27
above. These two conditions are satisfied in our case as long as p, σ2A and σ
2
E are bounded
from above, which makes practical sense. In the pathological case σ2A = 0, σ
2
E = 0 or |ρ| = 1,
|CHˆAHˆE | = 0 and the PDFs are unbounded, which makes practical sense since h(RˆA, RˆE) →
−∞. Unfortunately, finding the analytical rate of convergence of the differential entropy is
intricate.
All of the following expressions should be understood in the asymptotic sense as σ2A → 0 and
σ2E → 0 and |ρ| → 1. Using the chain rule for the differential entropy h(X, Y ) = h(X)+h(Y |X),
the general expression of the differential entropies of Rayleigh and normal distributions, the joint
differential entropy of the distribution fHigh
RˆA,RˆE
(rˆA, rˆE) can be easily computed and we find
h(RˆA, RˆE)→1
2
log2
(
p2(1− |ρ|2) + p(σ2A + σ2E)
)
+
1
2
log2
(
pie3+γ
4
)
.
Inserting this expression in (16), together with the expressions of h(RˆA) and h(RˆE) given in
(14) and (17) respectively, we finally obtain
I(RˆA, RˆE)→1
2
log2
(
(p+ σ2A)(p+ σ
2
E)
p2(1− |ρ|2) + p(σ2A + σ2E)
)
+ χ
→1
2
log2
(
p
p(1− |ρ|2) + σ2A + σ2E
)
+ χ,
with the definition of χ introduced in Theorem 1, which concludes the proof.
C. PDF of Alice, Bob and Eve’s Envelopes
We know that HˆA, HˆB and HˆE follow a ZMCSG with covariance matrix CHˆAHˆBHˆE , which
gives
fHˆA,HˆB ,HˆE(hˆA, hˆB, hˆE) =
1
pi3|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
e
2p(p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2E)hˆAhˆ
∗
B+2pσ
2
B<(hˆAρ
∗hˆ∗E)+2pσ
2
A<(hˆBρ
∗hˆ∗E)
|C
HˆAHˆBHˆE
|
e
−
|hˆA|2|CHˆBHˆE
|+|hˆB |2|CHˆAHˆE
|+|hˆE |2|CHˆAHˆB
|
|C
HˆAHˆBHˆE
|
.
This PDF can be expressed in polar coordinates as
fRˆA,RˆB ,RˆE ,ΦˆA,ΦˆB ,ΦˆE(rˆA, rˆB, rˆE, φˆA, φˆB, φˆE) =
rˆArˆB rˆE
pi3|CHˆAHˆBHˆE |
e
−
rˆ2A|CHˆBHˆE
|+rˆ2B |CHˆAHˆE
|+rˆ2E |CHˆAHˆB
|
|C
HˆAHˆBHˆE
|
(25)
e
2p(p(1−|ρ|2)+σ2E)rˆArˆB cos(φˆA−φˆB)+2pσ
2
BrˆArˆE |ρ| cos(φˆA−φˆE−∠ρ)+2pσ
2
ArˆBrˆE |ρ| cos(φˆB−φˆE−∠ρ)
|C
HˆAHˆBHˆE
|
.
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The joint PDF fRˆA,RˆB ,RˆE(rˆA, rˆB, rˆE) can be obtained by integrating (25) over the phases φˆA,
φˆB and φˆE , which leads to the result of Lemma 5. Indeed the first two terms do not depend
on the phases, so that they can be put out of the integrals. The third term however does. One
can easily see that the phase of ρ does not impact the result, so that it can be removed. One
can further notice that the cosines do not depend on the absolute phases φˆA, φˆB, φˆE but on their
differences. Making a change of variable φ1 = φˆA − φˆB, φ2 = φˆA − φˆE , we see that the last
difference is φˆB − φˆE = φ2 − φ1. Hence, one integral simplifies.
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